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4While the term Private Military Companies (PM Cs) is sometimes used  in the literature, the acronym “PSCs” is more
appropriate in a cumulative sense. It is fact that while some firms provide services which are more  military in
orientation, others concern themselves with protection and more passive duties. But in the final analysis, there is
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1
In Ottawa, back in December 1997, over 120 states signed the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.1 
Though in a strict legal sense, the Ottawa Convention, an official element of international law
since coming into force in March 1999, applies only to its signatories, the Treaty’s normative
implications have spread beyond its stated adherents.  Production has slowed, the international
trade in landmines has lessened, and non-signatories will have a hard time using them as
international pressure, given weight by the convention, increases.2  Also, the convention
highlights the importance of humanitarian demining, an activity whose primary end, viewed
holistically, is peace-building.  The removal of landmines is incorporated into the larger
processes of societal rejuvenation and rehabilitation.  Even if 60 to 100 million landmines remain
in-ground and many are still planted every day, it is now estimated that more are being taken out
of the ground than are planted.3  This provides a greater sense of security and normalcy to
peoples living in mine-infested states.
More recently, in May 2000, attention shifted to the means used to achieve the goals of
humanitarian demining.  Great controversy surrounded the decision by the United Kingdom’s
Department for International Development (DFID) to grant a Private Security Company (PSC),
Defence Systems Limited (DSL), a £1 million contract to remove unexploded clusterbombs and
landmines in Kosovo.4  Previously, the London-based DSL, a subsidiary of the American
security conglomerate Armor Holdings, has held contracts with governments, Multinational
Corporations (MNCs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and the United Nations (UN)
for operations, including humanitarian demining, all over the world.  But some of these
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operations have been the subject of international criticism.  In particular, DSL, as part of its
duties guarding oil installations for British Petroleum in Colombia, is accused of training human-
rights abusing Colombian soldiers in counter-insurgency techniques and feeding intelligence on
environmentalists and community leaders to the Colombian police and military.5  Even stronger
allegations include the importation of weaponry.  In reference to the DFID contract, many critics
in and out of government resented money being given to an entity whose operations, albeit in
another country in this case, seemed anti-thetical to the overall goals of humanitarian demining.
Yet reliance on a firm such as DSL is not unique.  Spurred on by this and similar examples, this
paper’s subject matter pertains to how the means employed to achieve humanitarian demining
may, in either the country being demined or elsewhere, retard the overall desired end of human
security.  Indeed, the 1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) features seven essential and overlapping components threatening human
security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.6  These
issues are not necessarily additive nor are they prioritised.7  Pursuing one objective may impact
upon the successful pursuit of another objective because the effects of one may detract from that
of another.  Because human security is deemed a universal, interdependent concern, actions taken
in one area of the world, no matter how beneficial their impact upon individuals, may have
detrimental effects on those living elsewhere.
To complete the project, the paper is divided into two parts; the first part provides an explanation
and the second adds to policy-making.  The first part describes the benefits arising from
humanitarian demining and then identifies reasons why outside, non-state assistance is needed
for this undertaking.  Essential here is an understanding of the PSC, a new post-Cold War non-
state security actor.  While turning to the private sector may be a necessity, the PSC industry as
currently managed and regulated poses unique problems for states and NGOs in their
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humanitarian demining operations.  In this regard, the paper explores why these problems may
have been overlooked despite the negative impact of some PSC activities.  Finally, the second
part addresses ways to help overcome both the problems inherent in PSC activity and the reasons
why solutions to them have not yet been found.  It offers a sketch of an effective regulatory
framework of the larger PSC industry which would have direct beneficial effects for the specific
issue of humanitarian demining.  Without regulation of this kind, the more problematic aspects
of this new industry may gain legitimacy “through the back door” due to the current salience and
popularity of humanitarian demining thanks largely due to the Ottawa Convention.
As noted in 1997 by Lloyd Axworthy, then Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, landmine
removal is a major part of the larger agenda of human security demanding the worldwide
promotion of human rights, sustainable development, and good governance.8  Motivated by this
linkage, the paper’s overarching argument is that if humanitarian demining is more than just
simply detecting and digging mines out of the ground, one must pay close attention to the means
employed and how they may be effectively managed in order to achieve the most desirable ends. 
If the abolition of landmines is at the heart of the human security agenda, and if a prime objective
of Canada and other like-minded states is not only for the convention’s effective implementation,
but also for the greater realisation of the overall human security agenda it represents, then the
PSC issue must be addressed.
PART ONE
The Need for Humanitarian Demining
The Ottawa Convention, the first ever instance whereby a whole category of conventional
weapons has been outlawed, focuses upon a weapon with grave humanitarian consequences. 
Although difficult to quantify, the detrimental effects of landmines go further than the 26,000
annual civilian victims of landmines reported by the International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC).9  Beyond the physical pain associated with the loss of life or limb, landmines are known
to have: affected the delivery of emergency relief, discouraged investment, altered patterns of
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production and transportation, inhibited the return of refugees and the demobilisation of
combatants, fuelled malnutrition and the spread of disease, and prevented post-conflict recovery. 
A common ingredient in this mix is fear given that the number of landmines may be irrelevant;
the mere threat of mines can achieve these outcomes.  In short, landmines can affect social,
political, and economic stability and, thus, the development of a society.
Humanitarian demining is an attempt to ameliorate this situation.  In terms of thoroughness, it
goes beyond military demining or ‘breaching.’  While breaching need not ensure 100% removal,
100% clearance is demanded for humanitarian demining because populations must have
confidence that cleared areas are safe.  Linked to this concern is an appreciation of the people-
centric nature of humanitarian demining.  The goal of humanitarian demining is not just getting
rid of landmines, but doing so in a way that fosters social, political, and economic development
and reconciliation.10  This was reinforced by the now defunct United Nations Department for
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), the entity once responsible for UN humanitarian demining:
Humanitarian Mine Action is not about mines. Rather it is about people and their
interactions with a mine-contaminated environment. The aim of a mine action programme
is not therefore a technical engineering objective - to survey, mark and eradicate
landmines - but a humanitarian and developmental aim which seeks to create an
environment in which people can live more safely and in which economic and social
development can occur free from the constraints imposed by landmine contamination.11
Indeed, this process must be conscious of basic human needs and the requirement of overcoming
fragmentation and division caused by conflict.  For Jan Eliasson, the former United Nations
Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, “[i]t is essential to view the land mine
problem as central to peace-building programs rather than merely as a factor on the margin of a
country’s development.”12 This contextualised, people-centric approach to mine removal is made
Spearin  Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised Security  5
13Faltas,“Getting Rid of Mines,” p. 430.
14United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report.
15Mike Croll, The History of Landmines (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1998), p. 151.
16Hubert, “Challenge of Humanitarian Mine Clearance,” pp. 319-320.
plain in the Bad Honnef Guidelines developed by NGOs and the United Nations International
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in Germany in 1997.  The United Nations Mine Action
Service (UNMAS), the latest UN entity given the task of organising and facilitating humanitarian
demining, subsequently adopted these guidelines in 1998.13
In this light, humanitarian demining is nothing less than vital for the success of the human
security agenda.  If human security concerns how people live in a society, how freely they make
their choices, and how much they have access to market and social opportunities, then
humanitarian demining is at the heart of this process in mined states.14  In sum, humanitarian
demining addresses the issues of safety, removal of fear, and protection from sudden and hurtful
disruptions in the patterns of daily life, all factors that are a part of human security.
The Need for Outside Assistance
Although the UN recognises the importance of outside expertise in order to build capacity, an
objective of its approach to landmine removal is the development of indigenous capacity. 
Reasons of cost are coupled with peace-building motives.  The UN wishes populations to take
control of their own rehabilitation efforts and to give their demobilised soldiers a useful task to
which they can apply their expertise.
Despite this laudable goal, outside expertise will continue to be required to serve as a catalyst for
indigenous efforts and to provide needed managerial expertise.  Indeed, the existing reliance on
international programming and the distribution of aid and expertise have made it such that in
locales like the Balkans and Africa, host countries have had little interest in initiating demining
operations themselves.  This is because they realise the saliency of the landmine issue
internationally and, thus, they know that outside resources will likely be forthcoming.15  While
perhaps reinforcing this undesirable trend, the international creation and monitoring of
management skills pertaining to demining is, nevertheless, essential.  For example, although
13,000 Afghans were trained in demining techniques, very few actually engaged in the activity.16 
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Furthermore, the accident rate was high and the quality of the demining poor; many people were
not able to develop a sense of confidence critical to the success of humanitarian demining. 
Therefore, it is important that a careful balance be struck between indigenous considerations and
effective management and landmine removal.
It is also evident that the employment of modern mine removal technologies requires outside
assistance.  Technological advancement is felt to be a solution to the woes of many mine-infested
states.  Achieving a fifty-fold increase in capacity is possible with current technological
achievements.  A similar improvement via manual methods is unthinkable; it would require
training and deploying 170,000 to 200,000 deminers worldwide, a virtually impossible task
whether using foreign or indigenous expertise.17  However, the minimal education levels of many
potential indigenous deminers make it unlikely that they all will be able to use new tools
effectively.
This poses the question of what means are available to create this balance and to provide this
technological expertise.  Even if the militaries of developed world states, given their expertise,
appear as obvious candidates, past history and attitudes dictate otherwise.  True, militaries, if
instructed, will perform duties that fall outside traditional mandates and functions.18  But,
undeniably, military planners often have difficulty accepting humanitarian type activity as a
military responsibility.  This translates into operations in the field which see humanitarian
approaches and policies not always fitting well into the calculus of the military mind-set. Indeed,
the goals and processes of humanitarian and military demining diverge at the simple unplanting
of landmines.
In the case of Bosnia, for instance, the UN estimates that at the end of the war over 300 square
kilometres posed a definite landmine threat while an additional 200 square kilometres were
potential risks.  Though NATO peacekeepers, then and now, both perform demining and oversee
the demining operations performed by the entity armies, the priorities have frequently not been
people-centric nor have they met humanitarian standards.  This is odd given that many NATO
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member countries have wished a quick return of refugees, a goal which requires effective
humanitarian demining.  As an example, by mid-1997, only 1% of the estimated number of
landmines planted had been cleared.  Moreover, these removed landmines were only those which
directly threatened NATO forces.19  Also, military timetables were short-term and demanding of
a quick exit strategy.  Recall the impossible demand in the Dayton Peace Accord indicating that
all landmines were to be removed within 30 days of the start of the NATO mission.  Factors
shown in this case prove difficult to reconcile with longer-term peace-building plans.
True, efforts have been made to overcome this divide.  The United Nations High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) has published the handbooks Working with the Military and Handbook for
the Military.  Similarly, the latest British Army Field Manual stresses the dynamic and
challenging nature of humanitarian operations.  As well, the United States Army Engineer
School’s Countermine Training Support Center opened in April 1996 its Humanitarian Demining
Training Support Center at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.  This institution’s goals go further
than the development of capacity in military operations to include humanitarian demining and
interaction with NGOs.20
The irony is that even with this new sensitivity, military participation from developed world
states may be unlikely due to the mounting costs, the divided priorities, and the casualties
perceived in longer-term operations.  Studies have found that many countries, especially the
United States, are unwilling to undertake prolonged operations in complex political situations
characterised by unrest, the exact sort of situation where humanitarian demining is required for
the sake of human security.21  Though the military must overcome approaching “mission creep”
as “mission cringe,” the larger issue is that this role re-evaluation may be a moot point.22
Spearin  Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised Security  8
23Damian Lilly, The Privatization of Security and Peacebuilding: A Framework for Action (London: International Alert,
2000), p. 19.
24Hubert, “Challenge of Humanitarian Mine Clearance,” p. 321.
25Frost & Sullivan, “New Strateg ic Uses of Mine Countermeasures Could Offset Budget Restrictions,” (14 July 2000),
(biz.yahoo.com/bw/000619/ca_frost_s_5.html).
26Faltas,“Getting Rid of Mines,” p. 430.
The Privatisation/Commercialisation of Humanitarian Demining
Hence, humanitarian demining is increasingly becoming an area of expertise of the private
sector.  This is a part of the larger trend of privatisation in international affairs.  While the
delivery of aid and assistance was once the domain of the state, NGOs and private firms have
now entered the aid marketplace to the degree that private entities have begun to outstrip the role
of UN agencies and other bodies as the main providers of aid.23  As recent cases like Kosovo and
East Timor reveal, the marriage between private firms and ‘private’ NGOs is well established.
In the specific context of humanitarian demining, commercial firms working on the behalf of
either NGOs or UN bodies, and in some cases directly for donor states, have become the norm. 
The demand for humanitarian demining raised by the Ottawa Convention, tied to the sheer
overall size of the task worldwide, makes the industry both growing and well-paying.  In fact, the
first indication that humanitarian demining was to be a profitable undertaking came with the
contracts in Kuwait following the Gulf War totalling US$700 million.24  Recent strategic
research performed by Frost & Sullivan found that while the defence industry remains sluggish
in many sectors, mine countermeasures generated global revenues of US$397.8 million in 1999,
an increase of 17.4% from 1998.  This increase was attributed both to the continued planting of
mines and to the emergence and growth of NGOs and their demands for 100% clearance in
humanitarian demining.25  In sum, the total cost for removing landmines worldwide could well
exceed US$33 billion.26
A new breed of firm, the PSC, participates in this lucrative marketplace.  Many PSCs provide the
manpower, employ the technology, and train the indigenous deminers.  In addition to
humanitarian demining, the PSC industry writ-large offers a wide range of services from the
‘soft’ to the ‘hard.’ Although all PSCs do not sell all services, and in some cases do specialise,
collectively the industry provides: military advice and training, arms procurement for further
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PSC operations, intelligence gathering, hostage rescue, supply, transportation, logistics,
guarding, and, of course, humanitarian demining.  Only a few PSCs offer traditional mercenary
activities, the use of force and operational command, in spite of the publicity this small minority
has received.
At present, the industry, mostly based and sourced in the developed world, has been generally
tolerated by the international community.  Though regulation is largely lacking, it is clear that the
impact of PSC services can be significant and that the distinction between benign security
products and those which can have a direct effect on the political-military environment is
vague.27  In other words, all private applications of security expertise should be viewed as
sensitive.  It is obvious that this has a bearing on the overall holistic goals behind humanitarian
demining, and by extension, human security, whether focussed narrowly on the area of demining
operations or broadly on the operations PSCs conduct worldwide.  It is necessary now to identify
the negative implications pertaining to this situation and suggest reasons why it has been allowed
to occur.
The Implications
Obviously, a prominent concern regarding contracting remains agency problems. 
Notwithstanding their wish for good client relations, positive publicity, and repeat customers,
PSCs may shirk their responsibilities.  This issue is particularly acute for humanitarian demining
given that PSCs are a relatively new phenomenon and the humanitarian demining industry is
immature.28  Indeed, the effects of shirking can undermine the overall confidence necessary for
successful humanitarian demining.  Note, for instance, that while demining activities by the
entity armies in Bosnia are monitored by NATO peacekeepers, the activities of private firms
have not been awarded the same vigilance.  On the one hand, the use of private firms by the UN
and NGOs was their response to NATO’s minimal desire to conduct humanitarian demining
noted earlier.  On the other hand, the unfortunate result of relying on private bodies has been that
in some cases the quality and reliability of the work has been sub-standard with potentially
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deadly effects.29  Thus, those who employ PSCs for humanitarian demining should include
appropriate incentive structures and supplier monitoring in their contract arrangements in order
to mitigate risks.
But most important to this paper’s argument is that PSCs in their work, particularly for state
clients, often reinforce the political status quo to the detriment of long-term human security.  The
South African PSC Executive Outcomes (EO), for instance, was credited by policymakers and
NGOs alike for bringing stability to Angola and Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s.  As another
example, British-based Gurkha Security Guards (GSG), after completing demining contracts
alone and in conjunction with DSL in Southern Africa, provided military training to the army of
Sierra Leone in 1995.  In both these cases, however, the cost was that the underlying issues that
led to the conflict remained unaddressed, poor governance was reinforced, and the culture of
violence was perpetuated.
As revealed in examples such as the DSL case presented at the beginning, other PSC activities
may be problematic for the promotion of human security.  Certainly, accusing PSCs directly of
human rights abuses on civilians is not the issue; even the ICRC believes this argument is not
warranted.30  Moreover, as evident in policies such as the desire for security sector reform
supported by DFID and the American use of PSCs like Military Professional Resources
Incorporated (MPRI) to train African peacekeepers and reform the Nigerian military, PSCs can
potentially have a positive impact.31  Thus, it is possible that PSCs have the capability to
contribute to progressive change for the public good as manifest in humanitarian demining. 
Nevertheless, PSCs at present often serve instead to reinforce the current order, no matter how
unjust.  It incriminates humanitarian demining when a PSC provides different services or works
with different clients that neglect the negative impact on human security.  In this regard, one
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should note that Saracen International, a firm that offers demining capabilities and operates
primarily in Angola, was once a subsidiary of and relied upon the same personnel as EO. 
Because of the holistic nature of human security, this incrimination applies to areas where
humanitarian demining is underway and beyond.
The Reasons
The reasons humanitarian demining continues to face this problematic situation are varied and
implicate a number of actors.  In the large picture, one issue is the newness of the PSC;
understanding and regulation have simply lagged behind.  In spite of the fact that PSCs share
many of the characteristics associated with the word ‘mercenary,’ a term that acquired a
pejorative connotation in the 20th Century, they cannot be covered by the existing international
legislation governing mercenarism.  While PSCs are largely foreign, work in the area of security
expertise, and offer their services in return for money, their on-going corporate nature, their
desire to work with “respectable clients” like states and humanitarian organisations, and their
ability to capitalise on the trends of privatisation make them a breed apart.  Even the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism contends that PSCs “...cannot be strictly considered
as coming within the legal scope of mercenary status.”32
What is more, states seemingly prefer to keep PSCs as an option for statecraft.  In the developing
world, leaders appreciate the possibility that PSCs might be used to achieve their goals and
reinforce their governance when their security forces may be weak or disloyal.  This inclination
actually pre-dates the post-Cold War rise of the PSC.  The Third World pushed forward
documents such as the 1977 Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention and the
Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) 1977 Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in
Africa ostensibly to protect themselves from the scourge of non-state force.  Nevertheless, these
legal texts leave open the option for states to hire foreign security expertise.
But what of NGOs, the primary deliverers of humanitarian assistance and a key interface with
PSCs?  Why have they not developed their own standards to protect the integrity of humanitarian
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demining?  The answer is that quality control of this type may run contrary to the “contract
culture” which has become a main fixture in humanitarian operations, a field worth US$50-55
billion annually.33  The marketisation of humanitarian assistance, caused by the downloading of
caring from states to private bodies as part of the overall trend of privatisation, has created a
laissez-faire approach.  Furthermore, the globalisation of the aid business means that reach and
competition now extend worldwide.  This downgrades other concerns for the sake of greater
NGO exposure, an asset that facilitates further funding and operations.  “The day-to-day struggle
for survival of contract and media hungry NGOs is not necessarily synonymous with political
acumen, good management, and accountability, nor with sustainable programs”.34  The end result
is that helping the victim in the best way possible is ranked alongside other matters of
importance to NGOs.  The consequence is that a consideration of negative side-effects is often
overlooked.35
The thoughts of Sami Faltas are characteristic.  He argues “[g]iven that right priorities, adequate
resources, and careful guidance, all these kinds of organisations [military agencies, commercial
contractors, and humanitarian organizations] can work according to the high standards of
humanitarian demining.”  He also recognises that out of these three types of organisations,
commercial firms are most likely to conduct the humanitarian demining.  Yet, when confronted
by troubling aspects of some PSC activities, he replies that “the main thing is to get the demining
done properly, soon, and at an acceptable price.”36  “Properly,” in this sense, refers to nothing
more than 100% removal.  An appreciation for the negative impact of some PSC endeavours
would seem to be lacking.
Spearin  Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised Security  13
37UN turf battles are well-known, even in the midst of emergencies. For Roland Paris, while many UN institutions agree
on the need for better coordination, no institution wants to be “coordinated.” Paris, Roland. “Peacebuilding and the
limits of liberal internationalism,” International Security  22 (Fall 1997), (EBSCO). 
38See the UNMA S Internet webpages (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/mine/Standard/chap_2.htm).
Guidance from the UN to mitigate these effects is not forthcoming.  From one angle, this might
be due to the coordination and competition problems common for UN programming.37  UNMAS,
though responsible for the strategic management and coordination of all UN demining activities,
must still battle with the alphabet soup of UN fiefdoms which perform humanitarian demining. 
At least nine permanent UN and UN-affiliated bodies struggle for clout and resources associated
with this high profile activity.  Many more temporary ventures, like specific peacekeeping
operations, are also involved.  Before the creation of UNMAS, the DHA struggled with the same
problems in the field and in New York.  Reports of humanitarian demining in Southern Africa
and the Balkans divulge a lack of coordination and centralised management evidenced through
indecision, inefficiencies, and in-fighting.
From another angle, UNMAS has a narrow focus towards its development of mine action
assessment priorities, its mobilisation of resources, its development of technical and safety
standards, and its management of mine-related action.  A perusal of UNMAS policies reveals
concern regarding sound operational procedures, safety, quality control, and medical
qualifications.  In other words, these regulations attempt to overcome some of the principal-agent
problems, but they do not address the wider impact private contractors can have on humanitarian
objectives.38  Complicating this factor is that while UNMAS may set these guidelines, it lacks, as
found in the Bosnian case, the adequate capacity to enact the proper monitoring.  Vigilance,
which may not be forthcoming, rests with the private deminers themselves and those that employ
them.
PART TWO
Weighing Effective Regulation
If humanitarian demining is to achieve its holistic goals, PSCs must be subject to effective
regulation.  Indeed, without sufficient regulation, overall PSC activity may gain unquestioned
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acceptance, to the detriment of human security goals, due to the overwhelming attention placed
on humanitarian demining.
The United Nations, however, does not appear to be the likely organisational venue for such an
endeavour.  On one level, though human security may stress such important elements as good
governance and human rights, this rubs against the fact that the UN is still a state-oriented,
sovereignty promoting institution.  Developing world governments of member-states rely on
PSCs for their own longevity and stability and often overlook, or do not care about, the potential
negative consequences.  They would not tolerate the loss of the sovereign right to choose.
Indeed, the regulatory documents cited earlier leave this option open on purpose.  Due to the
global trends in the private security marketplace and the related proclivity of leaders in the
developing world to rely upon it, any UN regulation would likely necessitate excessive
compromise resulting in dilution, perhaps beyond utility.
On another level, it is similarly likely that the mandate of the seemingly most appropriate UN
body for regulation - the office of the Special Rapporteur on Mercenarism - while up for review
in 2001, will remain unchanged.  At present, the rapporteur’s mandate is directed by a conception
of non-state security expertise informed by the activities of the soldier-of-fortune, or vagabond
mercenary, the type that ravaged post-colonial Africa during the 1960s and 1970s.  It is mostly
developing world states that support these resolutions and the rapporteur’s mandate as it stands
now.  They are states that suffered from the activities of vagabond mercenaries in the past.  In the
present, soldiers-of-fortune plainly still exist, but the rapporteur’s mandate makes it difficult to
interpret and act upon this new and more influential breed of non-state security expertise and its
business plans involving state, corporate, and humanitarian clients.
If this is the case, what about the utility of current home state regulation of PSCs?  As
documented elsewhere, appropriate international legislation to govern the operations and the
competition of PSCs is non-existent.39  At the national level, many states have neutrality laws. 
Enforcement, however, is lax and their mandates are more appropriate for past great power
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competition rather than for the regulation of corporate security expertise.  As for the specific
regulation of PSCs, there are only two examples in the world - South Africa and the United
States.
In July 1998, South Africa enacted its Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act, an
initiative which regulates, but does not prohibit, the operations of South African-based PSCs. 
Although it bans the activities of the soldier-of-fortune mercenary outright, the act does provide a
broad definition of foreign military assistance into which PSCs fall: “advice or training,
personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence operational support, personnel recruitment, medical
or paramedical service, or procurement.”  The act also spells out the acceptability of “security
services for the protection of individuals involved in armed conflict or their property.”40  Firms
are required to register with the Department of Defence and to obtain licenses from the National
Conventional Arms Control Commission.  By a manner similar to arms sales, this same body
also approves PSC contracts on a case-by-case basis in accordance with criteria rooted in
international law.  In particular, Article 7 asserts that the committee must consider whether the
assistance would result in the infringement of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
territory where the assistance will be rendered, endanger peace in a region by introducing
destabilising military capabilities, or contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts.  The act
also indicates maximum jail sentences and fines for nationals and resident foreigners in South
Africa who participate in unauthorised non-state military operations.
The law’s problems, for the sake of this study, stem from both the nature of its enforcement and
its approach towards human security.  The broad definition of foreign military assistance goes
beyond PSCs to include potentially such entities as NGOs and universities; there is a blurring of
the distinction between security expertise in a conventional sense and out-reach programming to
the detriment of the latter due to the risk of government heavy-handedness.41  Given the
particular sensitivity towards constitutional rights in post-apartheid South Africa, the act has
faced substantial domestic opposition due to its expansive definition.
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Second, in regards to human security, the act’s guidelines lack the appropriate focus.  What is
permissible under the law goes beyond human security promoting services like humanitarian
demining or security sector reform.  Even with international law serving as guidance, the act still
allows for activity problematic for human security and, in a related manner, the people-centric
motives of humanitarian demining.  To expand, violations caused by those trained by PSCs and
by the reinforcement provided to regimes with troubled legitimacy due to their lack of good
governance and their reliance on the use of force are important issues.  While it is conceivable
that a PSC could upset a regional balance of power to the detriment of peace, it is more likely,
given the intra-state focus of much activity in the developing world, that PSC expertise would
help develop an internal calm, or at least pockets thereof, to the benefit of a government and its
military forces, no matter how perplexing their conduct.  One criteria for authorisation noted by
South African officials, whether or not a potential client government was democratic, does not
mitigate the situation.42  Many states call themselves democracies, no matter how nominal.  It is
crucial that periodic elections be accompanied by the requisite freedoms, liberties, openness,
tolerance, and upholding of the rule of law.  Thus, as a result of these two factors, it is not
surprising that some question the effectiveness of this legislation.
As for the United States, the only other country with any significant form of PSC regulation, its
approach shares similar characteristics to that of South Africa. Like military exports, the vetting
of foreign initiated PSC contracts is monitored under the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR).  PSCs must be registered under the ITAR guidelines and must seek
approval from the State Department’s Office of Defence Trade Controls (ODTC) for each
contract.  Once approval is sought, the contract is examined for its implications, including both
democratic development and human rights, by a number of offices within the department. 
Complementing this process is the abidance to any applicable policies pertaining to US relations
with another country, group of countries, or in regard to certain activities.43  But if no extra
legislation is applicable, the problematic aspect of ITAR guidelines alone is that they are more
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concerned with the wide gambit of UN foreign policy than the specific matter of human security
promotion.44  ITAR provides for governmental oversight and discretion, but not directive. 
The Ingredients for Effective Regulation
The South African and American cases, nevertheless, provide useful guidelines as to what should
and/or should not be done in the creation of an international human security-centric regime for
PSCs.  Taking into account these factors, in addition to the other evidence presented earlier, one
can sketch the trappings of an effective regulatory regime governing PSC activity.  This regime,
accordingly, also reinvigorates the humanitarian impetus in demining.
Effective regulation lies in the who and the what. For the ‘who’, the home states where the PSCs
are based, rather than all UN member states, are the main actors.  These states would need to
develop at the domestic level regulations pertaining to not only the licensing of firms but also to
their authorisation on the basis of how a proposed contract pursues the promotion of human
security.  In particular, regulations would specifically consider how the contract might contribute
to security sector reform.  Failure to seek such authorisation would result in appropriate
penalisation.  As this regime became instilled, concern over past operations would be minimized
as regulations standardised the marketplace.  The exception would be if contracts which had been
regulated revealed themselves later to have had negative implications for human security.  While
this approach does not necessarily restrict the usage of PSCs in military operations or training, it
does assert that PSC services should be framed by and be consistent with a larger project of
peace-building and conflict resolution. 
To complement these domestic endeavours, effective regulation would see the development of a
home state international regime.  This would make sure that no country’s firms had a competitive
advantage due to more lax standards to the detriment of both creating a level playing field and
peace-building.45  At first, the regime might be able to sustain its operations purely in terms of its
Spearin  Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised Security  18
hom e coun tries.
46Alex Vines, “M ercenaries and the Privatisation of Security in Africa in the 1990s,” in Greg Mills and John Stremlau,
eds., The Privatisation of Security in Africa (Johannesburg: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p.
47.
47The greyness is due to the fact that many defence com panies in their foreign sales now provide “sweetners” such as
long-term training and serv icing packages. 
ability to set standards and correct market imperfections by lessening information costs and
uncertainty.  However, the annual sales in the international trade of private security are projected
to grow from the current level of US$56 billion to over US$200 billion by 2010, an increase
equating to a compounded annual growth of 7%.46  As more firms enter the marketplace, as
brand names develop, and as competition increases, the regime may require strengthening
through the development of mechanisms to ensure compliance and apply censure.
Indeed, such a mechanism may be needed due to the very nature of human security itself.  While
the benefits of promoting human security abroad are perhaps accrued in a moral sense, in a
material sense the benefits through enhanced peace and stability are often indirect, hard to
perceive, and in the long-term.  Because of this, the rewards of compliance which might
reinforce a regime are not easily or quickly felt.  This is further complicated by political cycles in
regime member states, by the demands placed on policymakers by short-term interests, and by
the not always linear effects of peace-building in other political jurisdictions.  A strong regime
would prevent the fast-buck being sought or a destructive expression of self-interest.
It follows from the above that the ‘what’ refers specifically to PSCs.  To safeguard other activity
from this regulation, a specific definition of PSCs covering their characteristics would need to be
devised. Characteristics should include: the provision of security expertise, their corporate
nature, and their profit seeking motive.  The first characteristic would deal with the security
services sold by PSCs, ranging from the soft, such as the provision of advice, up to the hard,
including the actual use of force.  While the divide may be grey, security expertise pertains to
firms that provide primarily human skills and insights into soldiering, security, and the uses of
armed force rather than the straight provision of military manufactures, an interstate activity that
has existed, and to a degree been regulated, for a much longer period of time.47  The second
characteristic would focus upon actors that have a permanent structure, a long-term agenda
beyond just one contract, and a desire for good public relations and future contracts.  This would
Spearin  Assessing the Humanitarian Impact of Commercialised Security  19
48See references to the United Kingdom ’s Diplock Report in Anthony M ockler, The New Mercenaries (London:
Sidgwick & Jackson Limited, 1985), p. 356.
mean that ad hoc formations, the traditional approach of soldier-of-fortune activities, could not
possibly come into the scope of permissible activity.  As for the third characteristic, it is true for
mercenaries, some argue, that proof of motive is hard to obtain; emphasis instead should be
placed upon what they do, not why they do it.48  However, unless one accepts an extreme form of
benevolence or self-resourcing, the long-term, corporate nature of PSC operations implicitly has
at its centre the desire for profit. Likewise, the point of this exercise is not to compare the
attributes of different types of combatants; it is to contrast the PSC with other entities such as
NGOs and universities that do not feature profit as a central concern.  In short, an appropriate
definition would guarantee that limitations on the right of movement and association would be
less numerous and less expansive.
As a result, the “what” does not directly cover NGOs that rely upon PSCs for their skills in
training, guarding, or humanitarian demining. Indeed, while “home states” as the answer to the
“who” question helps to bypass the divides and competition in NGO operations today, home
state PSC regulations would provide assurances of human security quality control for NGOs in
their reliance on the private sector.  Also, a degree of enforceability would be possible given the
close financial links that exist between states and NGOs. Even though the provision of assistance
has increasingly become privatised, states, particularly in the developed world, remain primary
donors.  Hence, humanitarian actors that chose to employ a PSC without the necessary home
state authorisation might risk the potential termination of their public funding.  Similarly, the
influence of the regulation might spread to private benefactors and dissuade them from
contributing as well.
In the same vein, focussing on PSCs rather than on regulating the activities of developing world
governments helps directly to avoid troubling aspects regarding sovereignty.  On the one hand, it
was made clear in the early 1990s that sovereignty is not absolute.  But sovereignty does, on the
other hand, still exist as a valued institution and a key factor in international life.  Thus, from one
viewpoint, this approach sidesteps the difficulties surrounding conditionalities frequently seen as
intrusive by the recipients of outside assistance.  Avoided would be the resentment caused by the
requirements that call for economic or social changes which leaders would not have considered
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independent of the offer of assistance.  In this case of PSC regulation, the focus is on state
choices and the tools available as opposed to the more intrusive on-sight monitoring and on-
going conditionality.  Moreover, it does not indicate what states should or should not do but
rather limits the legitimately accepted means available to them.
This leads to another viewpoint: this approach does not limit the sovereign right of governments
to provide for the good life in the ways that they see fit.  It covers instead the transnational means
available to them that are based in political jurisdictions other than their own. Indeed, since the
early 1980s, the mantra of privatisation, downsizing, and the letting of contracts has restructured
the inter-relations between the public and private in both the developed and developing worlds. 
Though the rate of privatisation varies from state to state in accordance with political direction
and economic motives, it has been systematic and will likely continue.49  For Harvey
Feigenbaum and Jeffrey Henig, privatisation, for reasons of cost and efficiency, or for political
motives, has all-around appeal: “If any economic policy could lay claim to popularity, at least
among the world's political elites, it would certainly be privatization.”50  Nevertheless, since
PSCs appear to be here to stay, and since security expertise is a sensitive matter, and since states
increasingly appreciate the perceived values of downsizing and privatisation, thought must be
given to the conduct and effects of PSCs.  Without a doubt, while states have the rights to
privatise and to choose, it is also allowable that other states can limit what is offered on the
international marketplace.
Factors to Consider...
Although these may be the ingredients for effective regulation, one must appreciate the factors
which could prevent making this recipe a success.  The first factor is that because the PSC
industry is relatively new and constantly changing, states would have to expend resources to
monitor closely PSC activity as firms develop and interact.  Indeed, changes in the marketplace
are constant.  For example, RONCO, an American demining firm with experience in Angola,
Mozambique, Afghanistan, and Bosnia, well known for its expertise in mine technologies and
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the training of mine-sniffer dogs, started out as a development assistance firm before moving into
the realm of humanitarian demining.  At the same time, consolidation is taking place in the PSC
industry.  Armor Holdings, for instance, has been labelled a growth through acquisition oriented
company in a marketplace that is currently undervalued and thus presents no barriers to further
acquisitions.51  Attracted by its high profitability, Armor Holdings in March 2000 added to its
Mine Action Group the firm Special Clearance Services (SCS).52
Diligence would be also required because of the movement of services and contracts within the
industry.  It is clear, for instance, that firms alter their service packages over time, moving along
the continuum of soft to hard services.  For instance, GSG worked in demining and guarding in
many of the world’s trouble spots before turning to the more robust service of military training. 
It is additionally clear that sub-contracting and consortium building, to date a feature of the
industry, would have to come under the scope of the regulation.  In the case of humanitarian
demining, DSL, RONCO, GSG, Mechem, and Royal Ordnance have all been involved in these
kinds of activities to varying degrees with each other.  It also extends to the more robust services:
Sandline International relied upon EO to fulfill its controversial contract in Papua New Guinea.
In short, corporate manifestations and manipulations should not escape regulatory oversight.
The second factor, informed by regime theory, is that home states, despite the problems noted
above, would have to take a further interest in promoting human security.  One must look to the
independent role of states in this case because of the problems amongst NGOs which prevent
them from being mobilisers for action or, in the words of Ethan Nadelmann, “transnational moral
entrepreneurs.”53  Regimes can reflect more than just economic and political concerns of states;
humanitarian interests can also be engines for policy.  But to do so for PSC regulation requires
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that human security become more central to state conduct.  This centrality is pivotal because
studies on the evolution of non-state force reveal that states stepped in to regulate and monitor
only when their own interests were jeopardised by the activities of non-state formations.54 
Thus, one should be wary of PSC-home state interaction.  To a certain degree, a human security
impetus has somewhat informed the actual usage of PSCs by home states.  The United States
employment and oversight of MPRI’s Washington-sponsored security sector reform in Nigeria is
but one example.  There is also the fear that in the climate of downsizing, PSCs might be used by
home states to maintain their influence abroad by serving as the medium for de facto foreign
policy without the usual public oversight.  With respect to humanitarian demining, note the
contention that RONCO is an arms supplier that works closely with the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA).  Take this allegation: during its humanitarian demining in Rwanda in 1995,
RONCO imported explosives and armoured vehicles which, under the direction of the Pentagon,
were given to the Rwandan military in contravention of a United Nations arms embargo.55  True,
one may give RONCO the benefit of the doubt; equipment often has dual usage, one can always
question the reliability of the source, and demining has become a very competitive business
which opens the door to dirty tricks.  Nonetheless, the lack of transparency in PSC-home state
relations does nothing to remove the cloud of suspicion.  Therefore, a human security PSC policy
would have to envelop not only contracts let abroad, but those also those sought at home.
Beyond their specific interest in some PSC affairs, states would also have to overcome their
seemingly laissez-faire approach towards privatisation in the international system.  While
laissez-faire implies a high level of freedom and a lack of regulation, it is key to recall that it is
the result of governmental policy.  With respect to PSCs, they do not face regulation and
continue to work in ways which both are damaging to human security and are reshaping the
conduct of international life.
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As for the privatisation of relief delivery, many analysts talk of the “humanitarian alibi,” activity
performed that avoids essential political measures made by states.56  For the likes of Antonio
Donini and David Shearer, the more donor states magnify the importance of humanitarian
assistance to the degree that it becomes a mobilising myth, the more it can be used as a substitute
for political action and a contemporary form of containment.57  One can see in the words of
Andrew Natsios, the former director of the United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,
the degree to which humanitarianism has become a panacea:
Diplomats now use disaster response as a preventative measure to stave off chaos
in an unravelling society, as a confidence-building measure during political
negotiations, to protect democratic and economic reforms, to implement peace
accords which the U.S. had mediated, to mitigate the effects of economic
sanctions on the poor, where sanctions serve geopolitical ends, and to encourage a
political settlement as a carrot to contending factions.58
Putting all this on the plate of the private sector, and expecting timely and effective results, is
unrealistic.  Although privatisation may hold the means states wish to apply, it must also be
subject to the engagement of states to provide political direction.  States participating in the
proposed regime would have to take responsibility for the effects of privatisation and hold the
promotion of human security as a key motivating tenet of that responsibility.
Concluding Remarks
Obviously, as the last few sections show, re-instilling the ‘humanitarian’ in humanitarian
demining might serve as the catalyst for a much larger enterprise.  But in the even bigger picture,
this endeavour’s potential acceptability is actually based on the facts that it is relatively
conservative in nature and not nearly as ambitious as other possibilities.  It does not propose a
grand international regime for human security covering all state conduct.  It concerns only a
small number of states and while human security is its focus, it centres attention primarily upon
one type of actor.  In a similar vein, it does not propose intrusive conditionalities.  This mitigates
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the concerns of some critical to the human security agenda who see it as crusading, an activity
which will sacrifice order in the international system.59  Instead, this paper only makes the
suggestion that limitations be placed on certain privatised means that flow generally from North
to South, from home state to host state.
It is also obvious that although this course of action is not as demanding on the international
community, it is nonetheless important.  Humanitarian demining is core to the Ottawa
Convention, peace-building, and human security.  But because of reasons of expertise and post-
Cold War economic and political thinking, humanitarian demining rests largely in the hands of
private actors.  Privatisation by itself is not necessarily a bad thing; if appropriately conceived
and managed, it can bring about cost reductions, efficiency, and the effective attainment of goals. 
The difficulty, however, is that the work of private actors such as NGOs and PSCs, as currently
managed and regulated, along with the activity and attitudes of states, has resulted in some very
public problems.  At times these problems have occurred in areas where humanitarian demining
is underway, in other instances where it is not.  But in all cases they detract from the holistic,
human-centric aspects of human security.  These aspects are imperative: “Mitigating the effects
of landmines cannot be conceived simply as a technical problem.  To be effective, interventions
must always be linked to the broader objective of avoiding casualties and making productive
resources available, and must be situated within the broad social and economic context.”60 
Achieving the ends of humanitarian demining effectively as desired by the Ottawa Convention
lies in understanding the all-around impact of the means presently employed.
